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In recent years much international attention 
has been focused on the war in the former Yugoslavia , 
and in the many ethnic conflicts embodied in it.
While nationalist motives should not fee 
underestimated, it should fee noted that economic 
dynamics underly and fuel the nationalist drive.
The economic crisis of the 1980s was an attestation 
to the inherent instability of the Yugoslav political 
system. Part of the blame rested on misguided 
government policies, which chose to maintain low 
interest rates and an inflated money supply, in spite 
of their inflationary effects.
Some blame was also shared fey the "System of 
Workers* Self Management,** whose policy of income 
distribution as a fixed percentage of profits gave 
workers and managers the incentive to raise prices 
so that incomes would keep pace with inflation. In 
addition, the Self Management System discouraged 
productivity growth by placing restrictions on 
production decisions, and on the ability of industries 
to expand. Such restrictions were backed by the 
intrenched interests of the local and regional party 
aparati, which had as their goal to be able to control 
and to profit from their public sector Industries.
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Is i result, workers became disgruntled by the degree
of government intervention, and this discontent, in 
turn, led to strikes, and to calls for greater 
democracy.
As local and regional governments struggled to 
maintain control over their own internal economies, 
they often came into conflict with each other. The 
continuing decline of the economy made resources 
scarcer, and only served to heighten such conflicts.
The loose nature of the Yugoslav federation reinforced 
the tendency to place regional interests above the 
national well being. Economic competition played 
a key role in providing incentives for the break 
up of the Yugoslav state. In the end, interregional 
conflicts, combined with the growing popular discontent 
with hyper inflation, high unemployment, and plummeting 
living standards helped lead to a dirth of confidence 
in the federal government. Partly as a result, the 
tide was turned in favor of nationalist sollutions, 
and toward the appealing, but dangerous practice of 
blaming neighboring regions, and the Federal Governemt 
for "economic discrimination." Thus, the groundwork 
was laid for the current war.
The Economic Crisis# and G w  Respones
There were many factors which precipitated the 
economic crisis, but perhaps the most widespread was 
the general slump in the world economy. This had 
its most damaging effects on Yugoslavia through the 
resulting increase in import tariffs on Yugoslav 
exports to the US and the EC. The world recession 
also meant that fewer jobs were available, and, hence, 
Yugoslavia witnessed a repatriation of some 330,000 
migrant workers from western Europe* Not only did 
this severely reduce Yugoslav foreign exchange supplies 
through a decline in workers remittances, but it also 
led to the need to create new jobs at a faster pace 
than originally seen to be necessary. As we will 
later see, this only heightened the tendency to over 
employ labor, a common problem in Socialist societies, 
which guarantee employment as a natural right. Still, 
there were not enough jobs to go around. Adding 
to the employment problem was the annual migration 
of approximately 1% of the total domestic population 
per year of people from agricultural to urban areas 
in search of work. In 1979, there were 762,000
■ w m m : w-1 # w- M
. g®##:- g i :; g- i;
S lilS ili  ■ f&fflfgf: |  g  g;■: I4^ !g : § ■* g %g g-g "gigv :: ' v -  K  , ' : ^  : :a■a:g:rv-V^pSi-jS -* .;■ ;_.,-■
•' - „. • :-g . •
ggig
• gggg
unemployed, 450,000 of whom were unskilled, and
2410,009" of whom were women. Finally, Yugoslavia, 
as many other petroleum importing countries, was 
hard-hit by the second oil crisis of 1979, Oil imports 
rose f*:om only 5.55% of the total used in 1972, to 
23,3% in 1982, In sum, between the years 1973 to
1989, the dollar value of oil imports increased by
3 billion. The world recession, combined with the
debilitating effects of the oil crisis produced a
shortage of foreign exchange, so that it became
difficult for Yugoslavia to cover its imports. At
the same time, tight US monetary policy, and the highly
valued dollar kept interest rates high, and increased
the debt burden. Interest rates on deb* to the United
States alone increased by $4 billion a year in each
3of 1980, 1981, and 1982. In order to reduce the 
deficit, the Yugoslav government introduced measures 
to reduce consumption and fixed investment, The 
policy achieved its goals, at the cost of a sharp 
decline in productivity growth. The Yugoslav policy, 
however, did nothing to stop failing social sector 
industries from taking advantage of cheap credit from 
Yugoslav banks in order to “cover*' their losses.4
As a result of the unique structure of the
banking system, which we will later explore at length, 
starting in the late 1970s, banks were encouraged 
to give fresh credit to enterprises with liquidity 
problems, and new investment was stimulated by the 
relaxation of credit restrictions. As as result,
interest rates plummeted in 1979 from 9% down to 6,5%;
5far below the rate of inflation. It must be added
that many of these investments were poorly planned,
and many were concentrated in heavy industries such
as steel, for which the nation had no real comparative
advantage in terms of production costs. Foreign loans
also provided a large share of investment capital,
but this was likewise used unwisely, for projects
6such as multi-million dollar health clubs. Yugoslavia 
was truly producing on borrowed time, and the price 
would be paid in hyperinflation. In the first place, 
the abundance of bank credits had a devastating effect 
on the money supply. Of course, this provided 
substantial inflationary pressures.
Compounding the problem was the immense influx 
of migrant workers when the world economy soured. 
Yugoslav social sector firms, which were already 
working at over capacity, were now pressured by the 
federal government to employ more workers. This they
did, but the increase in employment in the social 
sector was still not enough to reverse the trend of 
an increasing population of unemployed youth,
Moreover# inflation had the effect of raising wages 
to unprecedented levels, As goods became more 
expensive# the real value of the wages declined# which 
forced wage rates to spiral upwards. This wage 
pressure was also fueled by the fact that almost all 
social costs# 80 to 90% of collective expenditures# 
such as spending on infrastructure# education# and 
health care came directly out of the wages of the 
individual workers. This placed a heavy burden on 
social sector laborers# whose wages were equalized 
within their firms as far as possible# according to 
the dictates of self-management doctrine. Also# since 
in the self management system the workers officially 
ran the industries# there was a tendency to keep income 
levels high. Thus# it came as no surprise that firms 
placed a much greater priority on the maximization 
of individual incomes than they did on efficient 
production. As a result, when the buying power of 
worker incomes declined due to inflation# firms simply 
raised prices. The dividends reaped from this strategy 
accrued mainly to the successful firms of the more
7developed regions, while others suffered.
By official estimates, Yugoslavia showed an 
average annual rate of real productivity increase 
over the period 1979-85 of .9%. This figure, however, 
reflected the fact that stock appreciation was not 
accounted for. When adjustments were made, real social 
product showed an annual rate of decline of .9%; a 
total decline of 5.5%, The total decline in real 
personal consumption over the same period was 3.1%.
In addition, real fixed investment fell by a total 
of 37,2%. The rate of capacity use declined in several 
branches of industry, and productivity overall 
decreased. An increase in the stock of unsold goods
Q
caused a liquidity loss in many enterprises. It 
appeared that almost the entire burden of personal 
incomes and consumption had passed onto the wage bill 
of enterprises.
Yet although the federal government was concerned 
about the wage and price inflation, it was highly 
alarmed by the steady rise in Yugoslavia^ mammoth 
trade deficit. It saw the decline in the real 
productivity of Yugoslav firms to be a result of the 
failure of their exports to compete on the world 
market. With this in mind, in the late 1970s and early
7
81980s, the government promoted policies which were
intended to reduce this trend. First, it tried to
squelch internal demand through imposing measures
to reduce collective consumption and fixed investment,
and through imposing wage controls in order to minimize
personal incomes. The theory was that a smaller
internal market would encourage firms to export more
goods abroad in order to maximize profits. Wage
controls usually only further fueled inflationary
pressures, since when firms suspected that these were
imminent, they rapidly raised prices to take advantage
of last minute opportunities. Moreover, many saw
such controls as temporary measures, and as a result,
9few attempts were made to comply with them.
A second strategy took the form of direct import 
controls. These included both the usual tariffs and 
quotas, as well as the rationing of foreign exchange 
for imports. Until 1985, the social sector firms 
were allowed to retain only a portion of their foreign 
exchange earnings, and the remainder was to be returned 
to the government. This privilege was only enjoyed 
by designated "export firms." This caused unrest among 
other industries, which claimed that they had equal 
rights to the foreign exchange, since they produced
9many of the secondary products which were used in 
the production of export goods. In addition, the 
question of inter regional differences was brought 
to the forefront, since most of the major exporting 
firms were in the comparatively wealthy republics 
of Slovenia and Croatia, As a result of pressures 
from the underdeveloped republics, as well as from 
the "non exporting" firms, the government, much to 
the dismay of Slovenia and Croatia, required all 
foreign exchange to be placed in federal banks in 
exchange for dinar payments. Any industry that 
demonstrated a need for hard currency would have to 
apply for a loan. In practice, however, there were 
more requests for loans than there was available 
supply. This allowed the government to allocate its 
foreign exchange on a priority basis. Payments on 
the debt were priority number one, and next came the 
needs of "exporting firms." Thus, there was no real 
change in hard currency allocation after 1985. In 
1988, however, after as part of an agreement with 
the IMF, the Yugoslav government finally allowed a 
free market in foreign exchange.10
Partly in order to compensate industries for 
their loss of control over hard currency, the
10
government also introduced a system of export
subsidies.11 This was not unlike its policy of export
premiums in the 1960s, which paid firms from 10% to
32% of the foreign market price for exported goods.
This meant that export of officially listed products
could receive exchange earnings of 825 to 1040 dinars
per dollar. This had the same effect as a dinar
devaluation from its initial rate of 600 to the dollar,
1 2to 750 dinars per dollar. The subsidies imposed
after 1985, however, were far less generous, and what
was more, there simply were not enough currency
reserves available in order to make them a real
1 3incentive for exports.
The combination of the import restrictions and 
the foreign exchange rationing sharply cut back 
Yugoslavia's imports. From 1979 to 1985, imports 
of raw and intermediate materials fell by 17 por cent, 
and imports of machinery, transport equipment, and 
consumer goods fell by approximately 65 and 75 per 
cent, respectively. Although imports of capital goods 
gradually stabilized by 1982, the damage done to the 
economy was still tremendous. The quality of Yugoslav 
products was often undermined by substitution of 
inferior domestic components, and the technological
development of Yugoslav industries stagnated from
a lack of desperately needed foreign capital goods.
In addition, the drop in consumer imports encouraged
monopolistic tendencies in the economy, since without
the previous level of competition, domestic firms
1 4were free to raise their prices as they saw fit.
Another tool used by the government in order
to incriase exports was monetary policy. In 1980,
the dinar was devalued by more than a third against
the dollar, and by more than a third against the
Deutschmark Further devaluations continued until
1983. The intent was to make Yugoslav exports cheaper 
1 5abroad. Lydall draws a negative correlation between
the devaluations and export growth. He attributes
this to the fact that many of Yugoslavia's exportable
goods were highly import intensive, and required inputs
of foreign technology and resources. In addition,
Lydall points out that a prerequisite for a real
devaluation is for its effects to exceed the effects
1 6of domestic price increases. This reasoning reflects 
a commonly held view of the behavior of the "J curve.," 
which measures the time required for a currency 
devaluation to improve the current account. Since 
trade contracts are fixed in the short run, leaving
exports measured in terms of domestic output unchanged,
imports measured in domestic output will rise following
the currency's initial loss of purchasing power.
In most industrial economies, the "J curve" lasts
from six months to a year. In highly inflationary
economies such as Yugoslavia, however, it is difficult
for a nominal exchange devaluation to improve the
purchasing power of the currency, because the resulting
increase in demand merely pushes up domestic prices.
The prices of exportable goods rise as well, producing
a net negative impact on the current account.
It must be noted, however, that Lydall's analysis
of the effects of the devaluations on imports is based
on the years 1983 to 1985. Bartlet, in his more recent
1991 article claims that "Although exports increased
only sluggishly, the trade balance improved, and by
the end of the decade, there was a healthy surplus
1 7on the current account. " The value of imports in
1989 was less than it had been in 1980, while the
export values had increased by about 50%. The balance
of payments deficit of US $2,291 million in 1980 had
18become a surplus of US $2,427 million by 1989.
Bartlet does mention that in the years up to 1985, 
real export growth rates fell continually, which
confirms the verity of Lydall's analysis. Aparently, 
Yugoslavia did show a substantial "J curve" effect, 
although prices took less time to adjust than Lydall 
predicted.
Both Lydall and Bartlet are in agreement that
the devaluations had strong demand side repercussions.
In the first place, there was the problem of domestic
personal foreign exchange accounts. As a result of
the hyper-inflation, it became common practice for
Yugoslav citizens to convert their dinars into hard
currency deposits in both foreign and domestic banks.
This provided a hedge against the ever changing prices,
since the foreign exchange could easily be redeemed
for dinars. The devalued currency meant that owners
of such accounts could now demand more dinars for
their foreign exchange holdings. This clearly had
inflationary results, as well as being disastrous
for the banking system. Secondly, the devaluations
1 9caused increases in internal prices. According 
to Lydall, this was in part attributable to fact 
that in Yugoslavia, unlike in other countries, wages 
were determined as a set percentage of total enterprise 
revenue, rather than by contractual agreement. Thus, 
Yugoslavia had no adjustment lag in which real wages
14
would temporarily fall, and instead, enterprises quickly
increased export prices to compensate for the increase
in factor prices as a result of the high cost of imports.
The greater profitability of exports relative to domestic
sales created pressures for increases in personal incomes
of workers, which of course only added one more component
20to the rampant inflationary tendencies in the economy.
Throughout the 1980s, the Yugoslav federal government
made combating inflation its most important priority.
To this end, it introduced wage controls, which we have
previously discussed, as well as price controls. It is
well known that price controls have a tendency to result
in a shortage on the supply side, in addition to providing
a strong incentive to black marketeers to bid up the
prices. The government tried to compensate for such price
and output distortions by allowing price increases for
only selected goods and services, but this only complicated
the supply imbalance. Also, in a response similar to
that induced by the wage controls, social sector firms
anticipated the price controls with increased prices.
This fueled inflation, and made firms more inclined to
be concerned about personal income maximization, instead
21of their overall efficiency of production.
In sum, virtually all government attempts to reduce
inflation and to improve the balance of payments had the
net result of enhanced inflationary pressures. Why was
the government so inept in its handling of the crisis?
According to Lydail, its true flaw was its reluctance
to undertake what most economists at the time agreed was
the most potent solution: tight monetary policy. If the
government had raised interest rates, this would have
contracted the money supply, which would have eventually
brought inflation down to manageable levels. The catch
was that this would have also undermined the government’s
privilege to take advantage of cheap credits as a means
to pay its debts. Firms would also have been equally
resentful of the disappearance of negative interest rates
22on borrowed funds. It is also questionable whether
the federal government would have been able to impose
such a policy without a major reform of the banking 
2 3system. As we will later see, the interest of regions, 
communes, and basic organizations of associated labor 
had a very strong effect on the distribution of bank 
credits. The most important argument against tight 
monetary policy, however, was that a contraction in the 
money supply would also have meant a contraction in the 
growth of the economy as a whole. This would have implied 
both a decline in personal incomes, as well as the likely
16
probability that many firms would suffer losses. This 
in turn would open up the unfavorable prospect of 
increasing numbers of unemployed workers,^
These fears soon became reality in 1990, when in 
response to the incentive of credits of US $400 million 
from the World Bank, US $500 million from the EFTA, and 
US $2,500 million from the EC, the federal government 
agreed, among other measures, to a tight monetary policy 
with the objective of reducing inflation to a rate of 
thirty percent for that year. The results were exactly 
as Lydall would have predicted, although their effects 
were only short term. From the staggering rate of 64 
per cent in December 1989, inflation fell to 17% in January 
1990, and to 2,5% in March, By April, inflation had been 
eliminated, and prices actually fell at a rate of -.2%, 
However, by July of the same year, the country witnessed
25a 25% price increase, and a climb in wage rates as well.
It is still unclear whether the failure of tight 
money to take permanent effect was a result of the 
government’s failure to elicit compliance in the 
implementation of its policies, or whether it simply was 
not the most effective solution. It was clear, however, 
that the monetary constraints, combined with the 
government's new policy of closing down loss making
industries did have the effect of increasing the number
of unemployed workers. Such an introduction of employment
instability was intended to create labor market. This
was to be accomplished through employment contracts between
labor unions, owners of capital, and the state, through
new employment laws so that managers could vary employment,
and through the reduction of overskilling by means of
retraining offers, as well as through incentives for early
retirement. The most unsettling feature about this plan,
however, was the noticeable lack of any significant
26unemployment compensations. Indeed, the employment 
question would have explosive effects on the future of 
the Yugoslav federation. The reforms were eventually 
implemented, and a temporary respite from inflation was 
gained, but at what political cost?
Industrial Inefficiency and Workers1 Self Management
Up to this point, our main focus has been on 
the effect of government policies in fueling the 
economic crisis. Our analysis has, however, brought 
to light important systematic causes as well, such 
as the access of firms to soft credits, and the 
tendency of firms to maximize wages, and to minimize
18
investment savings. In order to explain these and 
other problems, we will now examine the system of 
workers self management, as well the Yugoslav federal 
system, itself.
The system of workers self management was first
established in 1950. In 1954, Self management bodies
were allowed the privilege of autonomous decision
making, regulating the volume and structure of
production. In 1957, the self management bodies were
given the right to control resources intended for
personal incomes, although resources for capital
investment were still controlled by the government.
At this time, a conflict emerged between self managing
agents, who mainly controlled resources for normal
operation, and central agents of economic policy,
who controlled expansion and production capacity.
Thus, in 1965, self management bodies were allowed
to control both enterprise operation, as well as the
distribution of surplus revenue. In the constitutional
amendments of 1971 to 1974, under the Law of
Associated Labor, the first "basic organizations of
associated labor" were established, which were intended
to give self management groups a greater voice in
27political decision making.
19
Self management was an attempt to give the workers
more say in the allocation of factors of production,
and in production decisions within their respective
industries. To this end, workers were organized in
enterprises, which were made up of basic organizations
2 8of associated labor at the firm level. The effect 
of the basic associations of labor was the 
fragmentation of enterprises. An extreme example, 
which Lydall mentions, was the railway system, which 
at one time was divided into 365 basic organizations, 
although by 1989, the number had been reduced to 
between 40 and 50, Each organization owned its own 
rolling stock, which was often incompatible with that 
of the others because of differences in the make 
of engines and cars. This required railroad crews 
to carry a large variety of spare parts and tools, 
which made repairs costly and time consuming. The 
Law of associate labor stated that each basic 
organization should be commercially independent, with 
its own price list. This meant that pricing within 
an enterprise sector could vary substantially, and 
would not necessarily reflect market values. Finally, 
the enterprises were further fragmented through the 
requirement by law that all the member basic
20
associations had to agree before a policy decision
could be made* Since there were many enterprises
which contained over 280 basic organizations, acquiring
29such a consensus was often next to impossible*
Although autonomous in decision making, basic
associations were also expected to contribute a portion
cf cheir earnings to their enterprise, which in
turn, contributed to a common regional fund for
expensive investment projects* The amornt that each
enterprise was allowed to borrow from such a regional
fund was determined by its previous contributions.
Yet the basic associations of labor were more than
merely a way to consolidate finance and to allocate
resources* They were also a central feature of the
Yugoslav political system. Indeed, the Federation
Parliament was chosen indirectly from them. In this
way, it was intended that associated labor would be
able to control all economic decisions which had a
direct or indirect effect on its position, its income,
30or its social status.
Perhaps it was the political influence of 
associated labor that allowed for an income retention 
policy that was strongly biased towards wages. From 
total income earned, each organization of associated
21
labor deducted all material expenses and depreciation 
of the means of production, thus arriving at the income 
that was at its disposal. Personal incomes were not 
deducted as production expenses because, under self 
management, the worker both managed social resources 
and invested his labor. Thus was eliminated the 
distinction between wages and profits, and with it,
the incentive to maximize profits and to minimize
v 31 costs.
Clearly, if the state had not stepped in, there 
would have been no revenues at all in the social 
sector. Thus, it declared that the workers must 
respect the economic obligation to allocate part of 
the basic association's income to consumption and 
part to accumulation. The division of revenues into 
wages and investment was to depend upon the level 
of productivity of labor, in the case of consumption, 
and on the rate of accumulation required to sustain 
future development. These terms were ambiguous, 
at best, and therefore the division of revenues into 
income and accumulation was determined by so called, 
"self management agreements" between organizations 
of associated labor and trade unions. In addition 
to their role in income distribution, such agreements
22
were also used as informal contracts for resource
allocation through intra-industry trade* These were
32mere formalities, and were hardly ever enforced.
State intervention was an integral part of the 
Self Management system. The Yugoslav government made 
every effort to remind the workers that theirs was 
a socialist economy. Workers had a responsibility 
not only to their own industries, but to "society 
as a whole." This meant that they were expected to 
contribute to social services such as health care 
and education. As we will later see, the difficulty 
for the Yugoslav government to collect taxes made 
it rely heavily on such worker "contributions".
Perhaps this could have explained why in the Civil
service, the second largest employment area, wages
33were low relative to those in the social sector.
This, however, was only the tip of the bureaucratic 
iceberg. Regional governments frequently showed 
desires to transform relations of social ownership 
to those of state ownership. Often they either tried 
to concentrate accumulation against the consent of 
workers, or to use banking resources without the 
consent of associated labor, in order to further 
alliances with state and political authorities. There
23
was a creation of state capital and a collusion between
managers and the state, and political bureaucracies*
It was well known that in order to become a manager
of a Yugoslav enterprise, one had to either be a local
party member, or else have the right connections.
The fact that such political control was usually
through local and regional party organizations went
a long way to explain the market fragmentation and
inter regional economic competition that ensued.
Workers saw such state intervention as a challenge
34to their own autonomy. This fact was manifest in 
the strikes in Serbia in the late 80s, in which 
frequent complaints concerned the excessive number 
of white collar "paper pushers" in the industries, 
and the subversion of Self-Management rights by the 
trade unions, which were controlled by the local and 
regional party apparatus.35
Particularly damaging to the economy as a whole 
was the government prohibition against "monopolies" 
under the 1976 Law on Associated Labor. In practice, 
this meant that if an industry were to acquire a branch 
company in another region, the new company would be 
completely independent of its parent, both in decision 
making, and in income allocation. Thus, there was
24
no incentive for corporations to expand. In part, 
the prohibition against monopolies was intended as 
hidden protectionism, since it was in the interests 
of regional governments to safeguard the domestic 
market share, and to prevent outside competition.
The effect on the economy was disastrous, however, 
placing severe limitations on the free flow of social 
and economic resources.^ In truth, then, under the 
self management system there really was no "Yugoslav 
Economy" to speak of, but instead, there was only 
a fragmented, bickering group of sovereign local and 
regional economies.
We have previously mentioned that the workers 
generally felt that their interests were not supported 
by the seif management system, and blamed excessive 
government intervention for its failure to operate 
effectively. Still, many of the faults resulted from 
the system itself and from the effects it had on the 
conduct of the workers. We have frequently stressed 
the fact that the workers' main concern had always 
been with their personal income levels. Thus, it 
would not be surprising if their attitudes toward 
production and marketing decisions were generally 
apathetic. Lydall gives several descriptions of
mandatory plant meetings, in which workers habitually
rubber stamped plans of their managers without any
discussion of their effectiveness. Although such
behavior could have been explained as a worker's
protest against a system in which their input would
not have mattered anyway, Lydall claims that the
workers were only concerned with issues that
interested them. Both Lydall and Pusic cite complaints
from managers about the lack of discipline on behalf
37of their workers. According to Lydall, workers 
knew that they could commit as many transgressions 
as they pleased without losing their jobs or suffering 
any reductions in pay. In fact, when time was 
subtracted for the days of absence and for the 
countless self management meetings, the actual number 
of hours worked in a working day of 8 hours was only 
3.5. In comparison, those in the private sector worked 
as much as 16 hours a day. According to Pol itica 
(December 30, 1960), as cited in Lydall, The total 
number of days per year in the social sector in which 
the workers were absent from work was roughly 150 
days, including Saturdays and Sundays, annual holidays, 
15 days of sickness, public holidays, 5 days of 
voluntary absenteeism, and leaves for weddings, births,
honey moons, and funerals. Some workers took further
advantage of their situation through engaging m
illegal activities, such as stealing industrial raw
materials, and then selling them on the black market.
Much of the lack of worker discipline could have been
attributable to the over manning of industries, which
3 8came as a result of the mandatory employment policy.
It was not surprising, then, that the position 
of company manager became one of the least desired 
jobs, and that there was often a shortage of applicants 
to fill the available positions. The manager was 
always the one who received the blame when things 
went wrong, and when his industry made profits, it 
was his workers who would get the credit. Enterprising 
managers would all too often find themselves facing 
opposition and hostility, as well, when their plans 
conflicted with those of local and regional 
governments. Communes would often declare branch 
corporations from another commune to be separate basic 
associations. This was a major disincentive for 
industrial expansion. Managers were not allowed 
to choose even their closest colleagues, and they 
were given no means through which to reward their 
most productive workers. Thus, they were adverse
27
to taking risks, and preferred to acquro revenue through
raising prices, rather than through increasing output.
They also often saw the fact that production decisions
had to be made by workers* councils, to be a chance
to "dilute the blame." In addition, Lydall cites managers
who complained about the frequent "self management
meetings" which they were forced to attend. They felt
that their time would have been more profitably spent
39in the actual running of their companies. Such
complaints, however, do nothing to obscure the fact that
managers would often themselves, take advantage of their
positions, through taking a "cut" of company funds.
In fact, Gagnon attributes much of the opposition to the
1990 attempts at economic reform to the managers' personal
40 39stakes in the old system. companies. Such complaints,
however, do nothing to obscure the fact that managers
would often themselves, take advantage of their positions,
through taking a "cut" of company funds. In fact, Gagnon
attributes much of the opposition to the 1990 attempts
at economic reform to the managers' personal stakes in
40the old system.
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Inefficient Systems of Bankinq and 'Faxatjjon
Also an important factor in caus : ng t he oconor ic
crisis was the behavior of the Yugoslav banking syster .
Yugoslavia had 170 basic banks, which were generally
members of associated banks. The later were intended
to finance major projects, arid to control foreign exchange
transactions at the regional level. In addition, there
was a Federation bank along with eight national banks,
one per republic and province, each of which acted
autonomously in the interest of the region in which it 
41was located. The lack of control of the central bank
over the national banks explains why capital flows between
regions were rare, with the exception of some flows
due to excess reserves. Basic banks were legally
controlled by local enterprises, and local "communities
of interest." In practice, however, banks were agents
of local and regional bureaucracies. Bank managers were
generally political appointees, and were often subject
to pressures from local governments and organizations
42of associated labor.
This characteristic produced an excess demand for 
credits, a problem which grew more urgent as the faltering 
economy caused industries to fail. Although some lending
was determined by Federal monetary policy, the vast
majority was the result of banks responding to local
liquidity demands. The autonomous status of the national
banks made it difficult for the federal bank to control
the money supply. Moreover, the inefficient taxation
system provided the federal government with an added
incentive to tax the population through higher inflation,
through allowing the money supply to increase. The banks,
meanwhile, were taking on the risks associated with the
insolvent industries, and by 1988, 80 of the 170 basic
4 3banks were known to be bankrupt.
2*)
"When the federal government wants to give selective 
credits at a cheap rate to priority industries, or for 
priority purposes, it does not raise taxes to finance 
those credits. Instead, it instructs the banks to give 
the credits. Similarly, when the government discovers 
that a large part of the loans raised from abroad have 
been used to make dinar loans to Yugoslav enterprises, 
and that dinar service payments on the latter loans 
increasingly fall short of the amount required to meet 
the interest and principal on these foreign debts, it 
instructs the Nati^al bank to cover the difference by 
issuing new money, "
In order to permit credits to remain cheap, interest 
rate# were ke pt 1ow throughout th# ’970s, despite rising 
inflation. Even in 19€0 and 1981, when prices rose by 
a# much as 30 to 40* per annum, the national banks discount 
rates did not exceed 6i, whi1 • • t he real interest rate 
was *20%, Beginning in 1982, however, under the influence
o f  p r e s s u r e  f rom t h e  IMP", i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w e r e  p u s h e d
u p w a r d s ,  and t h e y  c o n t i n u e d  t o  r i s e  u n t i l  by 1 9 8 5 ,  t h e y
were more in line with the inflation rate. However,
a c c o r d i n g  t o  L y d a l l ,  g i v e n  b o r r o w e r s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  l o w e r
r a t e s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  t h e s e  w e r e  s t i l l  e f f e c t i v e l y  n e g a t i v e
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Thus  i t  was  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  i n  1986
4 5and 1 9 8 7 ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a g a i n  t o o k  on  n e g a t i v e  v a l u e s .
W h i l e  t h e  l ow *-eal  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and t h e  a c c o m p a n y i n g  
demand f o r  l o a n a b l e  f u n d s  i n v o l v e d  b a n k s  i n  r i s k y  l e n d i n g ,  
t h e r e  was  a l s o  t h e  a d d e d  p r o b l e m  o f  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r i s k .  
The b a n k s  wou i b o r r o w  f rom f o r e i g n e r s  in  d o l l a r s ,  w h i c h  
t h e y  as: or; d i n a r  l o a n s  t o  i n d u s t r i e s .
In e s s e - v  * , - r  r b e t t i n g  t h a t  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s
w< * r e  ' r /  g o .  no to x f t h e y  d i d ,  t h e  v a l u e  o f
t h e  dir.-j'  ,o>anr w o u o  b*- i r . s ^  f i ^ i e n t  t o  c o v e r  t h e  loss 
i r, h<:s va i  o f  11,* • f o r - :  g f . eur  r e n c y  , In 1 9 7 4 ,  t h e  
e x c h a n g e  ru* was  •7 d i n a r s  p e r  d o l l a r ,  b u t  by 1 9 8 8 ,  t h e  
d i n a r  had - d e v a l u e d  to 1 , ; 00  to t h e  d o l l a r .  E n t e r p r i s e  
r e a l  va  h u e s  f e l l  t o  2 % o f  t  -h e it o r  i g i  n a 1 v a l u e ,  and t h e  
b a n k s  * as se t; s  m  r e s p e c t  t o  c o  11 e c  t * r> 1 e l o a n s  f  e  11 t o  
2% o f  t h e  d i n a r  v a l u e  o f  f o r e i g n  l i a b i l i t i e s .  A l s o  a 
m a j o r  s o u r c e  o f  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r i s k  was  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  
p o p u l a r i t y  o f  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  d e p o s i t s  a s  an i n s u r a n c e  
a g a i n s t  i n f l a t i o n .  T h e s e  w e re  converted i n t o  d i n a r  l o a n s ,
a s  w e l l .  As a r e s u l t ,  by 1 9 8 5 ,  bank d e b t s  t o  h o u s e h o l d s
a m o u n t e d  t o  a s t a g g e r i n g  $ 9 . 5  b i l l i o n .  L v d a i l  e s t i m a t e s
t h a t  i n  1 9 8 8 ,  b a n k s  would h a v e  had t o  c h a r g e  o v e r  200%
i n t e r e s t  on  t h e i r  l o a n s  i n  o r d e r  t o  r e p a y  t h e i r  
4 6d e p o s i t o r s .
Much o t  t h e  s t r a i n  or. t h e  b a n k i n g  s y s t e m  was  a
c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e  i n e f f e c t i v e  s y s t e m  o f  t a x a t i o n .  T a x e s
w e r e  c o l l e c t e d  a t  t h r e e  l e v e l s :  t h e  F e d e r a t i o n ,  t h e
r e p u b l i c  and p r o v i n c e ,  and t h e  commune.  The m a j o r i t y
o f  f u n d s  w e r e  c o l l e c t e d  t h r o u g h  w o r k e r  " c o n t r i b u t i o n s "
t o  " s e l f  manag em en t  c o m m u n i t i e s  o f  i n t e r e s t . "  Such
c o m m u n i t i e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  w e r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g
47agencies for financing and managing social services.
All republics and provinces had progressive income taxes, 
which were only imposed on income greater than three times 
the average net personal income per worker in their 
respective social sectors. Thus, in 198S there were little 
over 13,000 Yugoslavs taxed compared with 9 million 
employed. In addition, rates of over 80% in some republics 
encouraged people to seek out ways of tax evasion. The 
Federal Government also had trouble levying substantial 
taxes, since if it did so, it would have been accused 
of unfair income redistribution between republics and 
provinces. Thus, both the federal and national governments
h a v e  p r e f e r r e d  t o  r e l y  on i n d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  t h r o u g h  
i n f l a t i o n  and i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  money s u p p l y . 4 ®
Disparities in Interregional Economic Development
Interregional differences have long played an
important role in political and economic conflicts in
Yugoslavia. Much of the relative backwardness of Bosnia,
Kosovo, and Vojvodina can be in part attributed to their
historical legacy as former parts of the Ottoman empire.
In contrast, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia received their
independence after the first World War from the much more
prosperous Austro-Hungarian empire. In the 1980s the
per capita GNP in Slovenia was more than twice the average
for Yugoslavia, while that of Kosovo was less than a third
of the average. Together, the republics of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro
had the greatest degree of unemployment, poverty, and
inadequate social services of any of the Yugoslav republics
49and provinces.
The Federal Government was very much aware of such 
inequalities, and established two funds for regional 
development. The first was a national fund for backwards 
areas, to which each basic association of labor was
e x p e c t e d  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  a s e t  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e i r  s o c i a l
p r o d u c t .  The  s e c o n d  was  a " F e d e r a l  Fund f o r  t h e
A c c e l e r a t e d  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  U n d e r d e v e l o p e d  R e p u b l i c s
and K o s o v o " ,  FADURK, w h i c h  was f i r s t  e s t a b l i s h e d  in
1 9 6 5 .  FADURK f u n d s  w e r e  a l l o c a t e d  d i r e c t l y  from t h e
f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  b u d g e t  t h r o u g h  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  made by
r e p u b l i c s  and p r o v i n c e s .  In 1 9 8 2 ,  t h e  t o t a l  r e s o u r c e
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  s o c i a l  s e r v i c e s  fund  e x c e e d e d  1%
o f  t h e  Y u g o s l a v  s o c i a l  p r o d u c t ,  a l t h o u g h  in  1 9 8 7 ,  t h e
50average was  s l i g h t l y  r e d u c e d  t o  2 .5 % .
The results of this net transfer of funds, however,
were generally unimpressive. This fact is further
clarified whe . Yugoslav marginal simultaneous capital
coefficients are taken into consideration. Coefficients
in 1982, for the less developed regions were significantly
larger than those in the more industrially advanced
regions. This meant that a higher percentage of the GDP
was required to be diverted to capital investments in
order to achieve a given level of productivity growth,
51compared to the developed regions. According to Ramet 
some, but not ail, of the differences in capital 
coefficients between the developed and the undeveloped 
regions can be explained by the fact that labor 
productivity in the latter has always been less than the
f o r m e r .  T h i s  r e f l e c t s  the poor quality of education, 
t r a i n i n g ,  and h e a l t h  services in  these regions c o m p a re d  
w i t h  o t h e r s .  The d i f f e r e n c e  i n  c a p i t a l  c o e f f i c i e n t s  can 
a l s o  b e  e x p l a i n e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n d u s t r i e s  i n  t h e  
b a c k w a r d s  r e g i o n s  h a v e  had a g r e a t e r  t e n d e n c y  t o  be  
e x t r a c t i v e ,  and h a v e  t h u s  r e q u i r e d  a h i g h e r  d e g r e e  o f  
c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y . 52
A s e c o n d  t e l l i n g  i n d i c a t o r  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  f e d e r a l
d e v e l o p m e n t  p o l i c i e s  i s  g r o s s  d e m o g r a p h i c  i n v e s t m e n t ,
w h i c h  is calculated as t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  t h e  m a r g i n a l
s i m u l t a n e o u s  c a p i t a l  c o e f f i c i e n t s  and t h e  r a t e s  o f
p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h .  I t  p r o v i d e s  a m e a s u r e  o f  what
p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  GDP must  be  i n v e s t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  s u r v e y e d
p e r i o d  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  same p e r  c a p i t a  a c h i e v e d  l e v e l
c o n s i d e r i n g  n a t i o n a l  p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h .  C r o a t i a ,
S l o v e n i a ,  S e r b i a ,  and V o e v o d i n a ,  m  1982  had v e r y  l o w
r a t e s  o f  d e m o g r a p h i c  i n v e s t m e n t ,  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  M o n t e n e g r o
and K o s o v o ,  w h i c h  had t h e  h i g h e s t .  T h e s e  s t a t i s t i c s  a r e
n o t  s u r p r i s i n g ,  s i n c e  t h e y  a r e  m o s t l y  r e f l e c t i o n s  o f
t h e  large p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  K o s o v o ,
t h a t  o c c u r r e d  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  in  t h e  u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  
53r e g i o n s .  I t  i s  n o t  e n t i r e l y  t r u e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  
d e m o g r a p h i c  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  w e r e  t h e  s o l e  e x p l a n a t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  l o w  p r o d u c t i v i t y  g r o w t h  r a t e s ,  s i n c e  o t h e r  f a c t o r s
T h i s
i s  i n  p a r t  d u e  t o  t h e  l o w e r  o v e r a l l  l e v e l  o f  e d u c a t i o n
i n  t h e  u n d e v e l o p e d  r e g i o n s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  c u l t u r a l
54d i f f e r e n c e s  in  work e t h i c s .
A f i n a l  i n d i c a t o r  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  i n v e s t m e n t  p o l i c y  
i s  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  t h e  l e s s  d e v e l o p e d  
r e g i o n s  h a s  i m p r o v e d  i n  r e a l  t e r m s  from 1950  t o  t h e  
p r e s e n t ,  when s h a r e s  o f  a g r e g a t e  i n v e s t m e n t  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d ,  
t h e  g a p  b e t w e e n  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  and u n d e r d e v e l o p e d  r e g i o n s  
b e c o m e s  more  e v i d e n t .  In 1975  C r o a t i a  and S l o v e n i a ,  
t o g e t h e r  c o m p r i s e d  28.4% o f  t o t a l  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  f i x e d  
a s s e t s ,  w h i l e  K o s o v o  and M a c e d o n i a ' s  f i g u r e s  w e r e  a mere  
9 .5 % .  T h i s  sh o w s  l i t t l e  i m p r o v e m e n t  c o m p a r e d  t o  1966  
f i g u r e s ,  i n  w h i c h  C r o a t i a  and S l o v e n i a  c o n t r o l l e d  31.1% 
and K o s o v o  and M a c e d o n i a  c o n t r o l l e d  14.1% o f  f i x e d  
i n v e s t m e n t .  The  g a p  h a s  a l s o  b e e n  r e f l e c t e d  i n  
i n f r a s t u c t u r a l  and e d u c a t i o n a l  d i f f e r e n c e s .  A l t h o u g h  
C r o a t i a  a nd  S l o v e n i a  c o n s t i t u t e d  29% o f  t h e  Y u g o s l a v  
p o p u l a t i o n  i n  1 9 7 2 ,  t h e y  had 44% o f  t h e  n e w s p a p e r s  and  
46% o f  t h e  r a d i o  s t a t i o n s ,  w h i l e  K o s o v o ,  w h i c h  had r o u g h l y  
7% o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n ,  had o n l y  4.9% o f  a l l  v o a c a t i o n a l  
and t e c h n i c a l  s c h o o l s ,  2.7% o f  c i n e m a s ,  a n e  A l b a n i a n  
l a n g u a g e  d a i l y ,  and tw o  r a d i o  s t a t i o n s ,  o u t  o f  a t o t a l  
o f  174 i n  Y u g o s l a v i a . 5 4 *5
s u c h  as l o w  l a b o r  e f f i c i e n c y  a l s o  p l a y e d  a r o l e .
Lydall's comparison of social product per head in
the 19Sts with that in 1986 showed an increase in one
of the less developed regions, Montenegro from less than
60% of the average to 77%, and in Vojvodina, one of the
more developed regions, from less than the Yugoslav average
to 20% above it. Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo showed
relative declines in growth, while, by Lydails general
estimates, the relative positions of lovenia, Serbia,
and Macedonia did not change significantly. Lydall
explains, however, that most of this growth took place
over 1950-1970, and that it has leveled off substantially 
55since then. Thus, overall while investments in 
Yugoslavia have achieved some degree of growth, the lower 
relative returns on investments in the backwards regions 
as reflected by high capital coeficents, have rendered 
the ammount of captal invested insufficent to close the 
widening development gap.
Why have regional disparities persisted, despite 
the massive sums of government funds intended to alleviate 
them? Many analysts have pointed to the fragmented self 
management system for an explanation. Lydall stresses 
the fact that the technologically advanced regions had 
no control over how their funds would be used by the 
backward areas. Thus, it was common for money to be
37
wasted through investments in capital intensive industries.
and in unueeded luxuries for party members. In order
to give firms more control over investment decisions,
the federal government also supported a policy which 
encouraged direct investment by basic associations of 
labor in the backwards regions. From 1976 to 1980 they 
were allowed to use 20% of their contributions to the 
Federal fund for this purpose, and in 1989, they were 
allowed to use 60%. This policy was largely unsuccessful,
as indicated by the fact that up to 1989, the average
proportion of contributions to the Federal Fund used for
direct investment did not exceed 2.5%. The reason for
this failure was the anti-monopoly clause in the Law of
Associated Labor, which left the industries with virtually
56no incentive to invest. It must be noted that, following 
the economic reforms of 1990, the industries were 
liberalized so that they could behave as normal rent 
seeking firms, although it is unclear whether this change
came soon enough to produce any lasting effects.
On many occasions, most notably after the 1976 law 
which increased FADURK contributions, but also as 
recently as 1990, the wealthier republics balked at what 
they considered to be an unfair redistribution of income 
to the backwards areas. Many, such as Slovenia, which
38
in 1991 had over 18% of its population inhabiting
•'undeveloped1* domestic sectors, thought that their first
duty was to use their funds to alleviate poverty mt home.
Thus, according to Ramet, there were frequent attempts
by Slovenia and Croatia to abolish the national development
funds. The final blow came in January 1990 when Slovenia
proposed to reduce its contribution by half. In February
of the same year, the board of FADUkK failed to reach
agreement on a financial plan for 1990 when the Slovene
delegation refused to cooperate. The Slovenes cited the
Serbian economic blocakade of Slovenian goods as their
reason for non compliance. The fund could not have
continued to exist without Slovenia, which together with
Croatia, contributed 45% of FADURK's liquidity. A futile
effort was made by the Federal Secretariat of finance
to freeze Slovenian accounts, until Slovenia contributed
its share. Then, in July, Croatia announced that it,
too, would stop making payments to FADURK. Two weeks
later, the Federal Executive Council announced that the
regional fund would cease to exist, and instead, the sole
source of such funds would be from a newly established
57"development bank."
Yugoslav Federalism and Interregional Economic Rivalry
The dispute over developmentsfunds is only one example 
the degree to which power had devolved to the republics
and provinces. This decentralization >f power was a
reflection of Yugoslav H federal ism," which had its
resurgence in the 1960s. In the reforms of 1 966#
Yugoslavia was opened to the forces of the market, freeing
the economy from direct political control. In 1971
constitutional amendments, following unrest in Croatia
known as the "Croatian Spring," the republics and provinces
were granted autonomy over budgetary and policy concerns.
In 1974, the republics were grated greater autonomy,
with provisions for consentual decision making on the
cofederal level and unit veto power. According to Lydall, 
the 1974 Law on Associated Labor, which established the 
seif management system, was itself an integral part of 
the federalist trend, and was originally perceived as 
a way of weakening the power of Belgrade. Unlike the
more familiar American system, the Yugoslav model gave
the republics and provinces virtually unlimited authority
59over internal economic and social policy. The 
combination of the federalism and Workers' Self Management 
was a recipe for disaster.
"When socialist self management is combined with 
federalism, it creates a whole range of new problems.
For now, each commune, with all its power over local 
enterprises, is combined with a national (republican 
or provincial) one party state* In Yugoslavia, each of 
these states claims the right to direct its own economy, 
to formulate its own social plans, to determine its own 
investment priorities, to raise its own taxes, to control 
its own national bank, and to establish its own balance 
of payments with the outside world. "
We have already seen several examples of how the 
centralization of power at the regional and local levels 
created distortions in the economy, such as the duplication 
of investment projects, the emergence of protection, both 
real and hidden, between republics and provinces, and 
obstacles to the free flow of investment capital and 
foreign exchange between regions. Clearly Yugoslavia 
was never, in truth, a single, unified nation. When, 
along with the fragmented system, we also consider the 
tendency for the republics to compete ruthlessly with 
each other on economic terms, we not only have the makings 
of an economic collapse, but of a political collapse, 
as well. Such a tendency was further enhanced by the 
scarcity of resources, as a result of the economic crisis.
An example which typified the degree of inter-regional 
economic related hostilities was the competition in the 
air transport industry. Until 1961, the only airline 
in Yugoslavia was the Belgrade based JAT. In that year,
the Slovenian government established its own airline,
Adria Aviopromet. Croatia responded by establishing Pan 
: Adria, which was finally approved after many complaints 
from the Serbs and the Slovenians. When business soured#
Pan Adria officials blamed Slovenia tor stealing Croatia's 
best pilots. In the late 1960s, JAT formed a subsidiary 
charter flight company, Air Yugoslavia, and Belgrade formed 
Acioaenex to cater to tourist groups. Croats accused 
the Serbs of "nationalist expansionism." In 1978, the 
Croatian airline went bankrupt, although the Zagreb 
government soon revived it as a national symbol.
Apparently, the existence of a Croatian airline was a 
more important consideration than the need to make 
profits.61
Soon, Bosnia decided that the time was ripe for it, 
too, to enter the airline business, after a sharp 
curtailment of JAT flights to Sarajevo. Serbia's reaction 
was immediately hostile, and it denounced the project 
for having no economic justification, and for being 
inherently a loss making proposition. Furthermore,
Belgrade began to spread rumors that Bosnia intended to 
finance the project illegally with FADURK funds. JAT 
opposed "the proliferation of airlines in Yugoslavia," 
and instead offered an agreement which allowed the
41
republican lines to handle the unprofitable routes* JAT 
also acquired the right to veto freight transport services 
by foreign airlines in Yugoslavia. This was a sever** 
blow to the regional airlines, since they depended upr-n 
foreign companies for their planes, JAT, itself, did
not have enough planes to fill the needs of Yugoslav 
companies, and so they were forced to ship their products
oy truck to the Munich and Vienna airports. This increased 
transportation costs, and was a contributing factor in 
the poor performance of Yugoslav exports during that 
period. In March, 1982, JAT Announced a "merger," in 
which it effectively took over Croatia1s service. In 
1990, Croatia fought back with the establishment of the 
new Croatia Airways. At the same time, JAT engaged in 
an air war with Slovenia, in which it tried to invoke 
Federal law to assert a monopoly over several of the 
Slovenian air line's connections. The attempt failed, 
however, and Serbia found itself unable to stamp out 
competition from the regional airlines.
A second example which typified the economic 
competition between the Yugoslav republics was the 
1976-1980 "Brotherhood of Unity" highway crisis. The 
intent of the joint project was to construct 432 
Kilometers of highway, of which 76 kilometers would be
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in Slovet*ia# 148 in Croatia, 145 in Sorbia, 13 in 
Vojvodina, and 50 in Macedonia* By the end of 1980, 
however, Croatia had comp1eted 137 kilometers, Serbia 
had fulfilled its quota, and was in the process of 
completing another 4*5 kilometers, Macedonia had completed 
57 kilometers, while Slovenia and Vojvodina had not even 
started work. Voj vodina * s procrastination was a result 
of its inability to secure foreign credits as a funding 
source, while Slovenia had decided that it should put 
its efforts into repairing its own decaying road system, 
instead of working on the Federation highway. Slovenia 
argued that construction of modern highways via Ljubelj 
and Potkoren to the Austrian border was financially more 
important. Vojvodina would never fulfill its quota in 
any event, therefore, whether or not Slovenia finished 
its share would not make any difference. By the summer 
of 1982, Vojvodina had begun work on a 17 kilometer 
stretch of highway, and the Slovenes had completed a 9.5 
kilometer stretch of highway west of Ljubljana. The 
Slovenes, however, were channeling most of their funds, 
which included a $31 million world bank loan, toward 
the completion of a joint project with Austria to complete 
the Karavanke Tunnel, linking Austria and Slovenia. Thus, 
once again, Slovenia had placed its republican economic
There are countless other examples of the degree
of competition between the Yugoslav republics. There
wai the argument between Slovenia and Montenegro over
Italian fishing compensation paymentsV Montenegro was
in favor of dividing the payments on the basis of the
length of coastline, since its coast was considerably
longer than Slovenians. The Slovenes, on the other hand,
preferred payments to be based on the size of fishing
fleets, because the Slovenian fleet was the largest in 
64Yugoslavia. When analyzing examples such as this, 
however, one can also ask the question of whether 
interregional competition in economic matters was a reason, 
in and of itself for the break up of Yugoslavia, or whether 
it was merely a mea s of expressing age old 
inter-nationality animosities. In a sense, the question 
is a pointless one, since it would be virtually impossible 
to distinguish between economic and political motives.
What is clear, however, is that given that economic rivalry 
was so prominent in Yugoslavia, it would not be at all 
surprising if it were also taken into consideration when 
Slovenia and Croatia broke with the Federation in 1991.
MThe escalation of ethnic tensions which threatens the 
survival of Yugoslavia as a political community has been 
exacerbated by two conditions: the uifficult economic
situation and the enormous foreign currency debt burden. 
In this critical environment! each republic strove to 
displace its economic burdens onto the shoulders of 
another. As this zero-sum game developed, each republic 
evaded its collective responsibility and viewed the other 
republics as opponents. This behavior, of course, 




The influence of economics on the political developments
in Yugoslavia was particularly felt in the Kosovo uprisings
in the 1970s. According to Plestina, the outbreaks of
violence there were primarily responses from the educated
young population to high unemployment levels and the high
cost of living. In 1980, the President of the Kosovo
provincial committee gave a speech in which he upheld
Kosovo’s economic demands, and warned that if these were
not met, then the future of the Federation would be in
jeopardy. The Kosovars responded with heavy street 
66rioting. Many Kosovars emigrated in order to escape 
economic hardships and political turmoil. From 1981 to 
1987, it is estimated that 874,000 Serbs and 900,060
Albanians left the region in search of work in Serbia 
and other republics. I t  was the emigration of t h e
Serbs, in particular, that would create the issue which 
would help to bring Milosevic to power in Serbia,
In 1988, economic events again played an important
role, as the Borovo workers went on strike in Belgrade.
The strike was a response to the intolerable economic
situation which resulted after a sharp drop m  the price
of crude oil. The declining oil prices reduced Soviet
demand for Yugoslav manufactures, which left the Borovo
factories with the dual problems of a goods surplus and
a deficit of foreign exchange. The workers' purchasing
power fell to the level of 1960, the equivalent of US
$150 a month. The striking workers demanded a 100% pay
increase to compensate for the previous salary freeze
and high inflation, as well as a guarantee of job security,
A frightened Federal government soon agreed with the
workers' demands, and in addition to guaranteeing jobs,
68it offered a 70% across the board pay raise.
According to Plestina's article, "Trials of 
Yugoslavia's Development," worker unrest such as the 
Borovo strike played havoc with the Federal Government's 
efforts to tighten the money supply as part of the 1988 
IMF agreement to re-program loans. Government hesitation
47
to go through with the policy, because of the inherent
loss of jobs that it entailed, jeopardized Yugoslavia's
long term relationship with the IMF. It was worker
populism which prevented the government from addressing
the economic crisis before it was too late. The way was
prepared for a leader to present himself as the popular 
69Messiah. Galubovic claims that the strikes, themselves, 
were directed more against the Self Management System 
than they were against the managers of the industries.
"According to sociological investigations, strikes in 
Yugoslavia have a broader meaning than appears at first 
fiance, in that the workers seem to confront merely the 
technical stratum in the factory, and not the state and 
the ruling class in general. Studies show, however, that 
beside material conditions and low wages, workers' 
dissatisfaction concerns also their inferior position 
in self management, which undermines their influence on 
social change. They raise the question of social, not 
merely their economic position, and demand the alteration 
of the working class's situation in society at large, 
and not only an improvement of the material condition 
of living. The fact that strikes become politicized speaks 
against the existence of an effective self-management, 
which workers do not find reliable as a means ^  fighting 
for the defense of their rights and interests. "
It was not surprising that the complaints of workers 
became "politicized" in this manner since, once economic 
grievances existed, it was natural that the Federal 
Government and the system which it had created would be 
blamed for them. It was also not unusual that people 
faced with high unemployment and rising inflation, in
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addition to a perceived lack of political liberties, would
t u r n  t o w a r d s  t h e i r  s e p a r a t e  n a t i o n a l  i d e n t i t i e s  f o r
solutions. Finally, thanks to the federal system,
dissatisfaction with general economic policy could be
translated into a sense of exploitation by rival republics.
Thus, national economies became the preferred means through
which national interests were defended. In 1987, Milosevic
solidified his power over Serbia, and gained popularity
through his hegemonic stance towards Kosovo. It is
significant to note that among Milosevic's many promises
to the Serbs was economic efficiency in the market, and
a solution to Serbia's many political and economic 
71problems* Gagnon and others have proposed that it
may well have been Milosevic's own inability to deliver
on these promises that inspired him to mask his failure
in the economic sphere with stepped up rhetoric against
the rival Yugoslav republics. In addition, he called
for a consolidation of Serbia's control over Kosovo, and
for the return of the migrant Serbs to the area to stave
off the inevitable numerical dominance of the Albanian 
72population* In the fall of 1988 and the winter of 
1989, Milosevic replaced local, provincial, and republican 
officials in Kosovo, as well as in Voevodina and 
Montenegro* Among the most vocal nationalist groups was
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the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, which blamed 
Yugoslavia’s economic troubles on ”incompetent” Federal 
Government officials. It also blamed the Yugoslav
7 1government for the ’’economic subjugation” of the Serbs,
The 1988 amendments to the Federal Constitution were 
intended to turn the Yugoslav economy towards a more 
pro-market emphasis. Most limitations on private ownership 
were lifted, except for land, which was limited to 60 
acres. In addition, joint stock companies, which 
distributed revenue on the basis of investment were 
allowed, and government bail-outs of failing industries 
were explicitly forbidden. Yet these reforms went against 
the interests of the regional party organizations, which 
saw them as a de-facto reduction in their autonomy over 
internal economic matters, In addition, the provision 
against industry bail-outs, if it had been implemented, 
would have spurred unemployment as insolvent industries 
closed down. The stalwart opposition of the republican 
governments aid other political interests made the reforms 
virtually impossible to carry out, in practice. In protest 
to the reluctance of the Federal Government to raise 
interest rates, Oskar Kovac, a market oriented economist, 
filed his resignation as a member of the Federal Economic 
Council. This action spurred a wave of discontent with
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the Mikulie government, and on December 30th, the Prime
74minister and the entire executive council resigned*
The following year, productivity levels and the standard
of living of Yugoslav citizens showed no improvement,
nationalism increased, and the public became preoccupied
with the state of the economy* The Slovenian constitution
was amended with a clause that gave Slovenia*s government
75absolute sovereignty and the right to secession*
In January, 1990, the Federal Government came out
with a new economic plan* It included pegging the dinar
to the Deutschmark, a temporarv wage freeze, free market
price-setting, and tight monetary policy. The policy
also allowed for more private ownership, and a provision
whereby socially organized firms could invest in branch
76companies across regional boundaries. At the end of
July, new additions were made, including further
liberalization of imports by a scaled decrease of import
duties, and a change or elimination of clearing agreements.
In addition, the six month wage freeze was limited, and
the discount rate of the National Bank was decreased from
23.4% to 14%. Despite all government efforts, however,
by the end of the year, there was still daily inflation 
77of 1.5%. The psychological insecurity of galloping 
inflation, combined with talk of imminent job loss
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associated with government economic restructuring only
made popular confidence in the Yugoslav leadership sink
further. The economic crisis was felt most strongly in
the less developed republics, particularly Kosovo, which
78continued to have an unemployment rate of 60%,
The same year that the Federal Government unveiled
its economic plan, elections took place in Slovenia and
Croatia, in both of which nationalist parties emerged
the victors. In what many agree were the most democratic
elections since Yugoslavia's founding, the DEMOS opposition
won in Slovenia by 55% of the vote, and Tudgman's Croatian
Democratic Union won in Croatia by 70% of the vote.
Plestina claims that there were three main motives for
this overwhelming vote against the LCY• First, the
Slovenian and Croatian peoples were dissatisfied with
the LCY, itself, which was seen to have mismanaged the
country, and to have brought it to the brink of economic
79and political calamity. A study by Ivan Siber of the
Croatian elections confirms that underneath the rhetoric
of nationalism there was much attention paid to economic
issues, and to the perceived economic discrimination by
80the Federation against the Croats. Second, there was 
a general fear of Serbian expansionism, which was already 
showing itself in Milosevic's policy toward Kosovo.
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Third, there was an anticentralization vote. After all,
although Slovenia and Croatia together comprised only
27% of the Yugoslav population, they contributed more
S1than 60% of the national GMP,
"Both Slovenia and Croatia tend to perceive the federal 
government as unsympathetic and often hostile to their 
problems, and investments in the less developed regions 
as motivated by local politicians* desire for 
aggrandizement at the cost of efficiency, solvency, and 
development. As a result, they chose to give the electoral 
mandate to political parties whose platforms rest on the 
defense of their nation's economic interest, integrity, 
and sovereignty. In the process, they declared themselves 
to be first and foremost nationalists, and if need be 
separatists. "
One of the first policies of the new Tudgman 
government was to consolidate central control over 
Croatia's economy by placing the previously "autonomous"
enterprises of the regions with the largest Serbian
populations under HDZ control. In addition, Serbs were
expelled from all government and police jobs. By February,
1991, the Croatian Assembly had voted to transform "social
property" into state property rather than undertaking
8 3privatization and market reforms. The Serbs were 
particularly outraged by Croatia's employment 
discriminations, and by the new industrial centralization. 
This discontent played directly into Milosevic's hands, 
and parallels were drawn to the Nazi-backed 
Croatian-Ustashi massacres of Serbs during World War
IX. Milosevic encouraged militant, violent groups to
infiltrate Serbian regions of Croatia. Such groups called
openly for the annexation of Croatia and Bosnia-Hersegovina
84 ~ uto Serbia as compensation for former war crimes. Perhaps
in response to previous failures of federal attempts to
raise interest rates, both of the new governments in
Slovenia and Croatia adapted restrictive credit and
monetary policy, drastically reducing cash flows. As
c result, unemployment in these regions in 1990 increased
from its level in the previous year, while unemployment
for Yugoslavia as a whole increased by 80% within a six
month period. Pensioners were hurt by the collapse of
failing enterprises, family savings declined, and social
8 5protests increased.
The same year, elections took place in Serbia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Serbia, 
Milosevic’s opposition, the Serbian Renewal Movement, 
a nationalist party, was given new fuel from the sorry 
state of the Serbian economy. Tanjung, the state news 
agency, as cited in Gagnon, reported just before the 
election that one third of the total number of collectives 
in Serbia had negative balances, and that the losses were 
ten times greater than in the same period of the previous 
year. Despite Serbia’s poor economic performance,
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M i l o s e v i c  c o n t i n u e d  t o  o p p o s e  l i b e r a l i z i n g  r e f o r m s ,  b e c a u s e
h e  d i d  n o t  want  t o  a l i e n a t e  t h e  e n t r e n c h e d  p o l i t i c a l
i n t e r e s t s  i n  S e l f  M a n ag e m e n t ,  and he a l s o ,  l i k e  o t h e r s
b e f o r e  h i m ,  f e a r e d  t h e  u n e m p l o y m e n t  t h a t  w o u l d  r e s u l t
f rom c l o s i n g  down i n e f f i c i e n t  f a c t o r i e s .  I n s t e a d ,
M i l o s e v i c  c o n t i n u e d  t o  b la m e  " F e d e r a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n "
f o r  S e r b i a ' s  e c o n o m i c  d o w n t u r n s .  In t h e  e n d ,  s u c h
n a t i o n a l i s t  a p p e a l s ,  c o m b i n e d  w i t h  r e a s s u r a n c e s  t o
c o n s e r v a t i v e  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  p a r t y ' s  c o m m it m en t  t o  j o i n i n g
t h e  EC w e r e  s u c c e s s f u l ,  and h e  r e c e i v e d  65% o f  t h e  v o t e
f o r  S e r b i a n  p r e s i d e n t ,  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n
c a n d i d a t e ,  D r a s k o v i c ' s 16%. M i l o s e v i c ' s  p a r t y  won 1 '<4
o f  2 4 8  s e a t s ,  w h i l e  D r a s k o v i c  won 1 9 ,  and t h e  u n i t e d
o p p o s i t i o n  won a t o t a l  o f  56 s e a t s . ® 6
In 1991, Milosevic was f a c e d  with anti-government
demonstrations i n  B e l g r a d e ,  a s  t e n s  of thousands of p e o p l e
p r o t e s t e d  t h e  p a r t y ' s  m o n o p o l y  on t h e  m e d i a ,  a s  w e l l  a s
g o v e r n m e n t  p o l i c i e s  i n  g e n e r a l .  H i s  a t t e m p t  t o  s e n d  t h e
Yugoslav army in to quell t h e  d i s t u r b a n c e s  f a i l e d ,  when
the Federal Government refused to honor his request.
It is interesting to note that one of the Serbian
government's eventual responses to the demonstrations,
according to Gagnon, was to a g r e e  to some modest economic 
87reforms. This suggests that M i l o s e v i c  perceived the
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popular unrest to be partly related to the poor state 
of the economy. A second response by Serbia*s government 
was to accept a de-facto confederation government during 
talks in Slovenia with the other republican governments.*^® 
The Agreement was summarized as follows by the Radio 
Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe, as it was cited 
in Richard Ware's House of Commons Background Paper, “The 
End of Yugoslavia."
“Yugoslavia would retain its identity as a multinational 
but united entity, keeping its current republican and 
national borders intact, a common Yugoslav military force, 
a joint parliament, a common foreign policy, and a 
collective head of state. The six republics would also 
use a single currency and have a market economy modeled
on that of the European Community. In all other areas, .
however, the republics would have almost complete autonomy 
they would govern their local affairs and have their own 
diplomatic missions, the right to apply for membership
in the 
forces.
y|ited nations, and their own territorial defense
♦#
From what we have said about the problems associated 
with the old federal system up to now, it seems that a 
confederational agreement such as this one would have 
been much more acceptable to all the parties involved.
In fact, however, according to the House of Commons 
Report, the agreement was far too ambiguous, as well as 
being too difficult to implement. On June 25, 1991, both 
Slovenia and Croatia simultaneously declared their 
independence from the federation. Besides the probable
economic considerations to which we have previously 
alluded, their break with the Federation could 
additionally have been a response to Serbia's blocking
of the Croat, Stipe Mesic, from the Federal presidency.
Also, by this time, Serbia's human rights violations in
Kosovo were well known, and the other Yugoslav republics,
perhaps rightly, feared similar heavy handed policies
91from Milosevic. From Serbia's perspective, since
Slovenia and Croatia were the wealthiest, and by far
the most developed regions of Yugoslavia, their secession
had the potential to cripple the already struggling
Yugoslav economy. There was also concern for the welfare
of Croatia's 12% Serbian minority. Moreover, Serbia's
desire for the continuance of the federation (with Serbia
as its center) would now be in danger, especially if the
92other republics decided to join the band wagon.
Thus began a long stretch of fighting between federal 
and Slovene forces inside Slovenia, and on its borders* 
According to the Slovene Red Cross, as cited by Ware,
65 people died in the fighting between June 27 and July 
11, including 37 soldiers of the Serbian dominated Federal 
army* On July 16, 1991, a total of 315 people had died 
in ethnic violence so far that year in Yugoslavia, 
excepting the casualtie# as a result of clashes with the
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f e d e r a l  army i n  S l o v e n i a .  T h u s ,  t h e  war i n  Y u g o s l a v i a  
had b e g u n .  In  t i m e ,  t h e  c o n f l i c t  w o u l d  s p r e a d  t o  C r o a t i a ,  
and f rom t h e r e  t o  B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a , w h e r e  i t  i s  s t i l l  
i n  p r o g r e s s . 93
While to present economic issues as the sole causes 
of Yugoslavians break up would be to tell less than the 
truth, nevertheless, it is important to study them so 
that the elusive term, ’'nationalism" can be better 
understood. After all, nationalism can not simply be 
a philosophical principle, but it must also reflect real 
conflicts between and among real interest groups. It 
Is true that conflicts often arise out of feelings that 
a particular group is being exploited by another, but 
where such perceived exploitation exists, there is almost 
invariably a mis-allocation of political and economic 
resources. It has been our purpose to bring to light 
the origins and the consequences of just such a 
mis-allocation in the former Yugoslavia.
From our analysis, it is clear that a combination 
of unsound economic policy, regional economic competition, 
and government interference with workers1 autonomy in 
the self management system resulted in an unstable economy 
as well as a decline in popular confidence in the Federal 
government. The politicisation of economic issues was
first witnessed in the frequent strikes of the 1980s,
As general concern about the decline in living standards 
increased, so did the power of nationalist leaders, such 
as Milosevic, who solidified his power partly through 
blaming Kosovo and the Federation itself for economic 
and racial conspiracy against the Serbs. While ethnic 
hatreds had long been inherent in Yugoslavia, the urgency 
of the economic situation demanded scapegoats. Moreover# 
the historically competitive nature of Yugoslav federalism 
made interregional rivalries all the more believable*
It may also have been true that republican leaders had 
incentives to divert domestic attention away from their 
own economic mismanagement* Stirring up regional rivalries
was an effective way of accomplishing this objective* 
Economic considerations likely played a strong role in 
the secession of Slovenia and Croatia# and utimately in 
the break up of the Yugoslav state# itself. Judging from
' r’
Croatia*s economic recentralisation and the expulsion^ N:;f, 
of Serbs from the work force after it broke with Selgradef 
there is substantial evidence to show that domestic 
political intersts had important incentives to favor a 
regional over a federal economy* Conversely# it is eguslly 
evident that Serbia's economic interests lay in keeping 
the two richest republics in the federation# Indeed#
iiv
the current war can perhaps be best explained as a conflict 
of interests. In this light, the existance of economic 
motives does not deny the importance of ethnicity as a 
motivating force, but rather, each compliments and enhances 
the other. Together, their influence is still felt, as 
the crisis in Yugoslavia continues.
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